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The Effects of Defendant Remorse 
on Mock Juror Decisions in a 
Malpractice Case 
Brian H. Bornstein, Ph.D., M.L.S., Lahna M. Rung, M.A., 
and Monica K. Miller, B.A. 
Abstract: The purpose of this study was to observe the effects of defendant re-
morse on monetary damages awarded to a plaintiff in a malpractice case. In two ex-
periments, the physician-defendant expressed remorse at the time of the incident 
and again at trial, expressed remorse at trial, explicitly demonstrated a lack of re-
morse at trial, or made no mention of remorse (or a lack thereof). Participants de-
cided how much money to award to the plaintiff and evaluated both the plaintiff 
and the defendant on several dimensions. Participants awarded greater compen-
sation when the physician expressed remorse at the time of the incident than in 
the other conditions, both when the plaintiff was the injured patient’s spouse in a 
wrongful death suit (experiment 1) and when the patient sued on his own behalf 
(experiment 2). This effect of remorse was greater for males than for females (ex-
periment 1) and for relatively severely injured plaintiffs (experiment 2). 
Malpractice suits against physicians are a prominent and contentious feature of the 
American civil justice system (see, e.g., Vidmar, 1995). Physicians are indeed respon-
sible for the welfare of their patients. However, as human beings they are apt to make 
mistakes. When mistakes are made in most social situations, the appropriate response 
is to apologize (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). Does this social strategy apply to physi-
cians as well, or must they protect themselves from (or in) litigation? 
The answer to this question has been up for debate (Cohen, 1999; Fiesta, 1994; 
Lowes, 1997). Some sources say that apologies are appropriate when medical mis-
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takes are made, as apologizing is the natural and humane thing to do (e.g., Lowes, 
1997). Physicians who do apologize may avoid suit altogether because of their hones-
ty. Many injured parties merely seek to fi nd answers to uncertainties surrounding the 
event that caused injury, to force wrongdoers to take responsibility for their errors, 
or to encourage the development of measures to prevent future injury (Huycke & 
Huycke, 1994; Sloan, 1991). Often, however, the goals of the injured parties are not 
aligned with the goals of the current adversarial legal system, resulting in plaintiffs 
receiving monetary awards, but not the intangible rewards they were seeking (Ba-
zemore, 1998; Goren, 2001). Most commentators agree that physicians should nev-
er admit fault, because such an admission may actually give patients the idea to sue 
(Lowes, 1997). Further, the adversarial system discourages wrongdoers from apolo-
gizing because it could be used against them in arguing that it is an admission of fault 
(Cohen, 1999; Goren, 2001). 
Cohen (1999) suggests that lawyers should encourage their clients, in some situa-
tions, to apologize. His legal analysis concludes that the benefi ts of apology include 
a reduced likelihood of being sued, more favorable settlement negotiations, and re-
paired relationships between the parties. In the case of medical malpractice, a doc-
tor who does not apologize for fear of being sued may inadvertently drive a wedge 
between himself and the patient, prompting the patient to sue (Cohen, 1999). Cohen 
suggests that an apology may help to alleviate this tension between the patient and 
doctor, thereby preventing litigation. 
Further, an apology can be conducted in such a way that the patient cannot use the 
apology against the client in court (Cohen, 1999). Concerns that apologies by phy-
sicians might imply negligence, while blocking the fl ow of information from physi-
cians to patients or their families, have led a few states to pass laws making apolo-
gies by physicians inadmissible evidence at trial. For example, a Massachusetts stat-
ute provides that 
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of 
benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an accident 
and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as evi-
dence of an admission of liability in a civil action (Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, §23D). 
Similar laws exist in Texas (Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, §18.061) and 
California (Cal. Evid. §1160), and judges in some jurisdictions have issued rulings to 
the same effect. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held that in a medical mal-
practice case, an apology by a physician for an “inadequate” operation is not an ad-
mission of liability (Phinney v. Vinson, 1992; see also Deese v. Carroll City Coun-
ty Hospital, 1992). Nonetheless, the majority of jurisdictions do allow a physician’s 
apology to be admitted as inculpatory evidence. 
Are legal expectations about the effect of an apology supported by empirical evi-
dence? Psychological research on apology has identifi ed four apology strategies that 
affect perceptions of the transgressor and the effectiveness of the apology (Scher & 
Darley, 1997). These strategies include remorse (an expression of sadness about the 
transgression), responsibility (an admission of fault), forbearance (a promise to avoid 
the transgression in the future), and reparation (an offer to correct the transgression). 
A transgressor’s feeling of remorse seems to be an especially important component of 
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apology, in that “the promise of forbearance, offer of repair and expression of respon-
sibility strategies each had an impact on the amount of remorse that was attributed to 
the speaker. Even in situations where the remorse expression was not explicit, sub-
jects read the apology as if remorse had been communicated by the speaker” (Scher 
& Darley, 1997, p. 138). 
Research has been performed focusing on the value of an apology and expressions 
of remorse in non-legal social situations. Children are taught to apologize when they 
make a mistake, especially as the consequences of their actions increase (Schlenker & 
Darby, 1981), and this lesson is reinforced throughout life. Remorseful children are 
blamed less, favored more, and recommended for less punishment than non-remorse-
ful children (Darby & Schlenker, 1989). More generally, apologies are the favored out-
come in a variety of social predicaments. They lower a violation’s impact on percep-
tions of the wrongdoer’s trustworthiness, character, interpersonal judgment, and likeli-
hood of future transgressions (Gold & Weiner, 2000; Orleans & Gurtman, 1984). 
Thus, apology and remorse affect many types of judgment, but how exactly does 
an apology bring about this change? There are two general factors that allow apol-
ogies to have such an effect, one involving the implications of an apology for the 
wrongdoer, and one involving the implications of an apology for the injured party. 
The fi rst way in which apologies may infl uence perceptions and judgments is 
through impression management. That is, apologies enhance impressions of the 
wrongdoer and are the most polite, trustworthy, and effective method of resolving in-
terpersonal confl ict (Takaku, Weiner, & Ohbuchi, 2001). People are driven to apol-
ogize largely because they strive to see themselves in a certain light. For example, 
a woman may believe that she is a caring, sensitive person; yet at times these be-
liefs are threatened, as when the woman hurts someone’s feelings. When this hap-
pens, several strategies, including apologizing, may be used in order to reestablish 
that this event was not an indication of the person’s true character (Bennett & Dew-
berry, 1994). Apologies often invoke a more positive view of the wrongdoer on such 
traits as likeability and goodness (Darby & Schlenker, 1989), and criminal offenders 
who show remorse are also seen as less likely to re-offend (Pipes & Alessi, 1999). 
This shift toward a more positive view of the wrongdoer may be, in part, because 
an apology connotes that a wrong has been committed but that the wrongdoer has had 
a change of heart. An apology suggests that the cause of the transgression was not sta-
ble and is therefore unlikely to happen again (Weiner, 1986). Thus, a wrongdoer who 
is remorseful is more likely to be forgiven because the injured party perceives that 
the wrongdoer is unlikely to repeat the offense (Gold & Weiner, 2000). Additional-
ly, apology may affect impression management by suggesting that the wrongdoer has 
already endured suffering and is therefore less deserving of additional punishment 
(Rumsey, 1976). 
The second way in which an apology affects judgments is by creating social con-
straints that infl uence the injured party to accept the apology. Goffman (1955) de-
scribes an apology as an offering to correct for the wrong and to re-establish order to 
normal social interaction. This shifts the focus back onto the injured party, who like-
ly recognizes that the socially acceptable reaction is to forgive the wrongdoer (Ben-
nett & Dewberry, 1994; Takaku et al., 2001). Injured parties, then, are put in a posi-
tion in which they must either accept the apology or violate normative social dynam-
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ics of personal interaction. Thus, apologies are often accepted because injured par-
ties are under social constraints that encourage them to do so. Because apologies cast 
the wrongdoer in a more favorable light, and because social norms require the in-
jured party to accept an apology, it is not surprising that judgments made concerning 
wrongdoers are more positive when the wrongdoer has apologized. 
Research has indicated that men and women may perceive apologies in different 
ways. For example, a study by Gonzales, Haugen, and Manning (1994) suggests that 
women are more likely than men to indicate that a simple apology would remedy an 
accidental transgression. This difference could be a result of the social norms that 
lead to gender differences in motivation. Men tend to be motivated by needs of pow-
er and status enhancement, while women are more concerned with maintaining rela-
tionships (see, e.g., Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). Thus, men are more likely 
to require that the transgressor do something to restore the damaged status or power-
lessness that the transgressor infl icted upon the victim, while women are more likely 
to give the transgressor the benefi t of the doubt (Gonzales et al., 1994). 
Transgressions with potential legal consequences, either criminal or civil, are ob-
vious examples of situations in which one party has (at least allegedly) harmed an-
other, and where an apology might be an appropriate response by the wrongdoer. 
However, research on apology in legal contexts has been limited to only a few crim-
inal jury simulations, has focused on the defendant’s expression of remorse, and has 
obtained inconsistent results. Rumsey (1976) gave mock jurors a summarized trial 
transcript in which an intoxicated driver hit and killed a pedestrian after being told 
to take a cab by a policeman. In the remorse condition, the defendant was described 
as “extremely remorseful,” and in the no-remorse condition, the defendant was de-
scribed as “gave no indication of remorse.” The defendant who expressed remorse 
received a signifi cantly shorter prison sentence than the defendant who did not in-
dicate remorse (Rumsey, 1976). These results may be consistent, on a psychological 
basis, with the equity principle, which states that physical suffering on the part of the 
defendant leads to greater leniency. Because the expression of remorse may be seen 
as psychological suffering, remorseful defendants may therefore receive shorter pris-
on sentences (Rumsey, 1976). 
However, other research has indicated that remorse does not signifi cantly affect 
jury decision making. For example, Kleinke, Wallis, and Stalder (1992) manipulated 
remorse in two studies. In an interview with a convicted rapist, the rapist showed re-
morse by saying, “I feel bad about it. I’m sorry for the woman and I wish it had never 
happened.” Alternatively, he showed no remorse by saying, “I don’t feel one way or 
another about it. I just did what I had to do.” In the second study, a control group was 
added in which the rapist simply did not mention anything about remorse. When he 
expressed remorse, the rapist was perceived as having a less negative character, more 
potential for rehabilitation, and was assigned fewer years in prison; but these effects 
were not statistically signifi cant. 
Crosby, Britner, Jodl, and Portwood (1995) also found that remorse was not a pre-
dictor of jury verdicts, even when the defendant’s age was manipulated. Crosby et 
al. gave questionnaires about a defendant found guilty of fi rst-degree murder to for-
mer jurors. The defendant’s age ranged from 10 to 19, and a parole offi cer told partic-
ipants that at the sentencing hearing the defendant either showed signs of remorse or 
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showed a complete lack of remorse. Regardless of the defendant’s age, a majority of 
participants voted for execution, and remorse did not predict jurors’ verdicts. 
Thus, remorse has been found to lessen sanctions in some studies but not in others. 
One explanation (albeit a speculative one) of these fi ndings is that remorse matters 
less for relatively severe crimes (rape and capital murder) than for less severe crimes 
(negligent homicide). Importantly, no study has found that remorse had a negative ef-
fect on criminal sanctions, and even when remorse has failed to affect sentencing, 
remorseful defendants nonetheless tend to be perceived more positively (Robinson, 
Smith-Lovin, & Tsoudis, 1994; Taylor & Kleinke, 1992). This lack of any negative 
effect of remorse in criminal cases is completely at odds with the general consensus 
about remorse in malpractice cases—that is, that it would make defendant physicians 
appear more negligent and lead to worse trial outcomes (Fiesta, 1994; Lowes, 1997). 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Because many crimes (e.g., drug offenses) do not have a readily identifi able injured 
party, civil cases are more likely to involve someone to whom a wrongdoer can di-
rect an apology. In addition, because most civil cases involve negligence (as opposed 
to intentional acts), they are more likely to involve the sort of inadvertent behavior 
where apologies are especially appropriate. The present experiment looked at the ef-
fects of remorse in a civil case, specifi cally, a malpractice case. Participants acted as 
jurors in a case scenario where a defendant physician had been found liable for neg-
ligently causing the death of a patient. Participants indicated the amount of money 
that should be awarded to the patient’s widow. The level of the physician’s remorse 
was manipulated. He made no mention of remorse, expressed remorse at the time of 
the event and again at trial, expressed remorse only at trial, or denied feeling any re-
morse. Because of the related research done in criminal cases, it was expected that 
the presence of remorse at trial would positively affect perceptions of the defendant 
and reduce the monetary damages awarded. However, it was also predicted that in the 
condition where the defendant showed remorse at the time of the event, as well as at 
trial, compensation would be higher because the mock jurors would perceive it as an 
admission of fault. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 173 undergraduate psychology students (63% female). 
Materials and Design 
Participants received one of four possible case scenarios in which an emergency-
room physician was found liable for malpractice (Jacobs, 1978; an excerpt is provid-
ed in Table 1). The physician misread a patient’s electrocardiogram and misdiagnosed 
him with acid refl ux rather than a myocardial infarction (MI). The patient (Xavier) 
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was sent home, but returned later in cardiac arrest and died. His wife fi led a wrongful 
death suit, seeking compensation for the loss of her husband. The summary contained 
testimony from the plaintiff, the defendant, and an expert witness (indicating liability 
on the part of the defendant). 
During the damages phase, the physician’s level of remorse was manipulated. In 
the control condition, the physician did not say anything indicating remorse. In the re-
morseless condition, he “indicated that he felt no remorse for his actions, and he ve-
hemently continued to deny that the death was his fault.” In the remorse condition, 
he “expressed remorse for the unfortunate death of Xavier. He said he was very sor-
ry that Xavier had died, while neither admitting nor denying that the death was his 
fault.” The early-remorse condition was the same as the remorse condition, except 
that the defendant also “expressed remorse for the unfortunate death of Xavier” at the 
time it occurred. 
Procedure 
Participants were told to assume the defendant was found liable and to answer how 
much money to award Xavier’s wife for her loss of consortium and pain and suffer-
ing. Participants also rated both parties on a number of dimensions, using nine-point 
Likert scales: overall perception of both parties and their degree of suffering; and the 
defendant’s honesty, competence, and remorsefulness. 
Participants took part in the experiment in small groups. They were randomly giv-
en one of the four malpractice case scenarios and made their case-related judgments. 
Results and Discussion 
Two-way ANOVAs (remorse condition × gender) were performed unless otherwise 
specifi ed. One extreme outlier (whose compensation award was ten times greater than 
the next nearest value) was removed, leaving 172 participants for analysis. 
Table 1. Excerpt of case scenario
________________________________________________________________________________
Xavier, a 42-year-old man, was taken to a hospital emergency room in 1995 by his wife, Linda, be-
cause he was complaining of severe chest pains. The pain was located underneath his breastbone 
and radiated to both shoulders. In the emergency room, Xavier had an electrocardiogram, which 
shows the electric waves that cause the heart to beat. 
Dr. Treadway, the emergency room physician, sent Xavier home, advising him to take an antacid. 
When Xavier arrived home he felt worse than he had felt in the emergency room. He was dizzy and 
started vomiting, and when he collapsed on the fl oor, his wife called the police and an ambulance 
returned him to the same emergency room he’d recently left. 
When Xavier arrived in the emergency room he was in cardiac arrest—no heartbeat. Anoth-
er emergency room physician, Dr. Jones, managed to resume Xavier’s heartbeat, though the pa-
tient’s blood pressure was extremely low. He was admitted to the hospital’s intensive care unit. 
When Xavier arrived in the intensive care unit, his heart had again stopped beating. Repeat resusci-
tation was unsuccessful. Xavier died. 
Dr. Treadway and Dr. Jones met with Linda and discussed the events surrounding the death of 
Xavier. Nothing was mentioned about possible negligence. However, ...Linda sued Dr. Treadway 
for malpractice. ...Her main case was based on the classic symptoms of a heart attack, which Xavier 
was complaining about and the abnormal electrocardiogram reading. 
________________________________________________________________________________
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Manipulation Check 
The remorse manipulation was effective, F(3, 164) = 31.99, p < 0.001. Participants 
perceived the defendant as more remorseful in the remorse (M = 5.65, SD = 2.36) and 
early-remorse (M = 5.29, SD = 1.80) conditions than in the remorseless (M = 2.43, 
SD = 1.78) and control (M = 2.37, SD = 1.56) conditions. It is noteworthy that the de-
fendant was perceived as equally remorseful when no mention at all was made of re-
morse and when he explicitly denied feeling sorry. Thus, participants’ default assump-
tion appears to be that malpractice defendants—even ones who have already been 
found liable for wrongdoing—do not experience much remorse for their actions. 
Compensation 
Six participants did not provide usable data on this measure, leaving 166 participants 
for analysis. The overall mean was $2,129,831 (SD = $5,206,672). Table 2 depicts the 
compensation awards by remorse condition and participant gender. Despite dropping 
the outlier, the data were still positively skewed and showed positive kurtosis, which 
are common characteristics of unconstrained damage awards (Greene & Bornstein, in 
press). The far-right (SD) column of Table 2 also refl ects a degree of heteroscedastic-
ity in the data, owing to the greater variance in cells with higher mean values (these 
same patterns were observed in experiment 2). 
There was a marginally signifi cant effect of remorse condition, F(3, 158) = 2.57, 
p < 0.06, with participants awarding greater compensation in the remorseless (M = 
$2,671,071, SD = $5,660,559) and early-remorse (M = $3,180,500, SD = $8,090,602) 
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conditions than in the remorse (M = $1,254,738, SD = $2,459,527) and control (M = 
$1,463,048, SD = $2,475,072) conditions. Males (M = $3,601,830, SD = $8,031,422) 
awarded greater compensation than females (M = $1,318,168, SD = $2,243,454), 
F(1, 158) = 8.24, p < 0.01. Males’ tendency to award more compensation than fe-
males is consistent with males’ tendency, in general, to require transgressors to do 
more to make things up to their victims (Gonzales et al., 1994). A marginally signifi -
cant interaction, F(3, 158) = 2.54, p < 0.06, suggested that males were affected by the 
defendant’s display of remorse, while females were not (see Figure 1). 
Perceptions
Means for the perception measures are shown in Table 3. Two variables assessed the 
participants’ perception of the plaintiff: the overall perception and the degree of suf-
fering (see Table 3). Neither varied signifi cantly as a function of the remorse condi-
tion, Fs(3, 164) < 1. Males and females did not differ in terms of their overall percep-
tion, but females (M = 8.41, SD = 0.84) perceived the plaintiff as having suffered sig-
nifi cantly more than males (M = 8.12, SD = 0.92). This result is somewhat surprising 
in light of the observation that females awarded the plaintiff less compensation than 
males. 
Remorse had a signifi cant effect on participants’ overall perception of the defen-
dant, F(3, 164) = 4.65, p < 0.01. The nature of the effect was consistent with par-
ticipants’ perception of the defendant’s remorsefulness: defendants who showed re-
morse (i.e., in the remorse and early-remorse conditions) were perceived more fa-
vorably than defendants who did not show remorse (i.e., in the control and remorse-
less conditions). The defendant’s remorse did not affect participants’ perception of his 
Figure 1. Mean compensation (in $1000s) as a function of defendant’s remorse and participant 
gender, experiment 1. 
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honesty, suffering, or competence, Fs(3, 164) < 2. However, gender did affect these 
perceptions: Compared with males, females perceived the defendant as having suf-
fered less, F(3, 164) = 6.99, p < 0.01, and as being less honest, F(3, 164) = 6.30, p < 
0.05, and marginally less competent, F(3, 164) = 3.32, p = 0.07 (see Table 3). Thus, 
just as females perceived the plaintiff more favorably, they also perceived the defen-
dant less favorably—even though they awarded the plaintiff less compensation. Fe-
males may be more likely than males to give transgressors the benefi t of the doubt in 
some circumstances (Gonzales et al., 1994), but not in others, such as transgressions 
resulting in legal action. 
EXPERIMENT 2
Wrongful death suits, such as that used in experiment 1, are an unusual type of tort 
claim because the principal injury is to someone (the decedent) other than the plain-
tiff. They are complicated further by the facts that there are statutory limits on what 
sorts of costs may be recovered, and the decedent’s claim is often joined at trial with 
claims by the decedent’s survivors (usually a spouse or child) for their own injuries 
resulting from the allegedly wrongful death. 
Experiment 2 was a replication of experiment 1 using a more traditional (i.e., non-
fatal) malpractice claim. It also extended experiment 1 by manipulating the severi-
ty of the plaintiff’s injury. Injury severity consistently affects civil damage awards 
more than any other single evidentiary factor (see, e.g., Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blum-
stein, 1989; Bornstein, 1998; Robbennolt, 2000), but it also interacts with a number 
of substantive and methodological variables (Robbennolt, 2000). Thus, experiment 2 
included injury severity in order to address whether the defendant’s remorse exerted 
similar effects across varying degrees of injury. 
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Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty-four participants (66% female) received extra course credit 
for their participation. 
Materials and Design
The case summary was the same as in experiment 1, except that the patient was de-
scribed as having survived his MI. There were two levels of injury severity: in the 
mild injury condition, Xavier’s condition stabilized quickly, his hospitalization was 
relatively brief, and by trial he had apparently made a full recovery. In the severe in-
jury condition, his MI was more serious, his hospitalization was lengthier, and by trial 
he still suffered continuing effects from the heart attack. 
The defendant’s remorse was manipulated as in experiment 1, with four condi-
tions: control, remorse, early remorse, and remorseless. Thus, the design was a 2 × 4 
between-groups design. 
Procedure
The procedure was identical to experiment 1, except that a question measuring par-
ticipants’ perception of the severity of the plaintiff’s injury was added as a manipula-
tion check. 
Results and Discussion
Six extreme outliers were removed, leaving 128 participants for analysis. There were 
not enough males in each condition to include gender as a variable in the full anal-
yses, which were consequently ANOVAs including only remorse and injury severi-
ty as factors. However, analysis of the main effect of gender yielded results consistent 
with experiment 1: Males awarded greater compensation than females, t(126) = 2.79, 
p < 0.01, yet they also perceived the defendant signifi cantly more positively overall 
and as having suffered more than females, ts(126) > 2.03, ps < 0.05 (gender effects on 
other perception measures were non-signifi cant). 
Manipulation Checks
The remorse manipulation was effective, F(3, 120) = 29.16, p < 0.001. As in experi-
ment 1, participants perceived the defendant as more remorseful in the remorse (M = 
5.12, SD = 1.96) and early-remorse (M = 5.10, SD = 2.27) conditions than in the re-
morseless (M = 2.12, SD = 1.62) and control (M = 1.97, SD = 1.36) conditions. Nei-
ther the main effect of injury severity, nor the interaction between severity and re-
morse was statistically signifi cant, Fs < 1. 
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The injury severity manipulation was effective as well, F(1, 120) = 32.01, p < 
0.001. Participants perceived the severely injured plaintiff as more severely injured 
(M = 7.72, SD = 1.08) than the mildly injured plaintiff (M = 6.33, SD = 1.64). The 
defendant’s remorse did not affect participants’ perception of the injury’s severity, nor 
was there a signifi cant interaction between remorse and severity on participants’ per-
ception of injury severity, Fs < 1.4. 
Compensation
The overall mean was $248,094 (SD = $533,713), substantially less than the mean 
compensation awarded in experiment 1 (over $2 million) for the same case, but where 
the patient had died and the damages went to his widow. Figure 2 depicts the com-
pensation awards by remorse condition and participant gender. There was a statis-
tically signifi cant effect of remorse condition, F(3, 120) = 3.50, p < 0.05, with par-
ticipants awarding greater compensation in the early-remorse (M = $432,903, SD = 
$937,172) condition than in the remorse (M = $239,574, SD = $332,760), remorse-
less (M = $190,045, SD = $318,185), and control (M = $137,444, SD = $226,522) 
conditions. Participants awarded greater compensation to the severely (M = $460,008, 
SD = $704,699) than to the mildly injured plaintiff (M = $55,158, SD = $131,797), 
F(1, 120) = 25.73, p < 0.001. A marginally signifi cant interaction, F(3, 120) = 2.54, 
p = 0.06, suggests that the effect of remorse by the defendant was greater for severe 
than for mild injury (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Mean compensation (in $1000s) as a function of defendant’s remorse and severity of 
the plaintiff’s injury, experiment 2.
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Perceptions
Means for all perception measures are shown in Table 4. As in experiment 1, partic-
ipants’ perception of the plaintiff did not vary signifi cantly as a function of the re-
morse condition, Fs(3, 120) < 1.6. However, compared with the mildly injured plain-
tiff, the severely injured plaintiff was perceived as having suffered more, and as more 
positive overall, Fs(3, 120) > 4.1, ps < 0.05 (see Table 4). These fi ndings are consis-
tent with previous research indicating that relatively severely injured plaintiffs are 
viewed more sympathetically in general (Bornstein, 1998; Wissler, Evans, Hart, Mor-
ry, & Saks, 1997). 
Remorse had a signifi cant effect on participants’ perception of the defendant’s suf-
fering, F(3, 120) = 3.30, p < 0.05. The nature of the effect was consistent with partic-
ipants’ perception of the defendant’s remorsefulness: As in criminal cases (Rumsey, 
1976), defendants who showed remorse (i.e., in the remorse and early-remorse con-
ditions) were perceived as suffering more than defendants who did not show remorse 
(i.e., in the control and remorseless conditions). The defendant’s remorse did not af-
fect participants’ overall perception of the defendant, or their perception of his hones-
ty or competence, Fs(3, 120) < 1.5. 
Injury severity had little effect on participants’ perception of the defendant. The 
defendant who was found liable for having caused a severe injury to the plaintiff was 
perceived as less honest (M = 4.54, SD = 1.91) than the defendant who was found li-
able for having caused a mild injury (M = 5.63, SD = 1.78), F(1, 120) = 10.25, p < 
0.005; but injury severity did not signifi cantly affect participants’ overall perception 
of the defendant or their perception of his competence or suffering, Fs < 2.7. This ten-
dency of a more severe injury to evoke any more negative perceptions of the defen-
dant demonstrates a clear extralegal bias, as the defendant’s behavior was identical 
across the different levels of injury severity. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The major fi nding of the present studies is that the defendant’s display of remorse af-
fected jury decision making in a simulated malpractice trial. However, the timing of 
the remorse was crucial. When the defendant expressed remorse at the time of the 
patient’s injury and again at trial, participants awarded the plaintiff more money for 
compensation; yet when the defendant expressed remorse only at trial, the plaintiff 
received approximately the same amount of money as when the defendant made no 
mention of remorse at all. There was some indication that the defendant who explicit-
ly denied feeling any remorse was also punished by having to pay greater compensa-
tion, but this effect was observed in only one of the two experiments. 
Defendants who made no mention of remorse were perceived as being no more re-
morseful than defendants who explicitly denied experiencing any remorse, suggest-
ing that mock jurors’ default perception of malpractice defendants is as relatively un-
caring. In contrast, defendants who showed remorse—regardless of when—were per-
ceived more positively than defendants who were not remorseful. These fi ndings are 
congruent with the literature showing that remorse leads to favorable perceptions of 
the transgressor (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1989). This positive effect of remorse has 
been found for both child transgressors (Darby & Schlenker, 1989) and adult crimi-
nals (Rumsey, 1976; Taylor & Kleinke, 1992). 
It is curious that, despite this more favorable perception, a defendant who apolo-
gized at the time of the event and again at trial nonetheless paid more in compensa-
tion than a defendant who showed remorse only at trial. This lack of concordance be-
tween mock jurors’ perceptions and their verdicts has two implications. First, it sug-
gests that, although jurors’ verdicts may be driven to some extent by their emotions 
(Bornstein, 1998; Feigenson, Park, & Salovey, 1997), their emotional responses are 
not determinative. Second, it suggests that jurors make inferences from both what de-
fendants say and when they say it. It seems likely that participants took the defen-
dant’s remorse at the time of the injury as an admission of wrongdoing or indica-
tion of negligence, but that the expression of remorse per se was not interpreted that 
way. Because participants did not judge the defendant’s degree of negligence but only 
awarded damages after liability had already been established, our data cannot speak 
directly to this interpretation. 
Often, injured parties in litigation seek primarily to fi nd out what happened, to punish 
wrongdoers for their mistakes, or to foster the development of measures to prevent sim-
ilar injury to others (Huycke & Huycke, 1994; Sloan, 1991). Unfortunately, these goals 
of the injured parties may not be aligned with the goals of the adversarial legal system, 
resulting in defendants receiving only monetary awards. Further, the adversarial system 
discourages wrongdoers from apologizing because, in most jurisdictions, it could be used 
against them by arguing that an apology is an admission of fault (Goren, 2001). 
An alternative legal approach that seeks to provide results more in line with the 
sorts of non-pecuniary results that many injured parties seek is a restorative justice 
approach. This approach, which is most commonly used in the criminal justice sys-
tem, holds that “justice cannot be achieved simply by punishing or treating offenders. 
Rather, justice processes must promote repair or an attempt to heal the wound crime 
causes” (Bazemore, 1998, p. 769). Restorative justice addresses the needs of both the 
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injured party and the wrongdoer, as well as the community as a whole. This process 
provides an opportunity for the injured party, the wrongdoer and often a member of 
the legal or therapeutic community to meet with a trained mediator to work out a so-
lution that is best for all parties. Such a process has reportedly had a powerful impact 
on the lives of those involved, both victims and offenders (Umbreit & Vos, 2000). 
Restorative justice could also be applied to civil lawsuits, such as malpractice cas-
es, in a manner similar to criminal restorative justice processes (Cohen, 1999). The 
injured party, the accused physician(s), and a representative of the medical communi-
ty would meet in order to determine the needs of each party. The medical communi-
ty would work with the physician to take appropriate measures to prevent recurrence 
of the injury, thus promoting an environment in which the community can feel safe 
and secure. In something like a more expansive version of the “early-remorse” con-
dition used here, the physician would be given the chance, prior to any legal action, 
to explain and to apologize, two things that would help the healing process for the in-
jured party. Thus, restorative justice eliminates a “win/lose” situation and encourages 
a “win/win/win” situation by providing holistic justice involving the wrongdoer, the 
injured party, and the community. 
The effect of the defendant’s remorse varied depending on two factors: partici-
pants’ gender (experiment 1) and the severity of the plaintiff’s injury (experiment 
2). The effect of remorse was limited to male participants: Males punished defen-
dants who showed remorse at the time of the event (or who denied feeling remorse) 
by awarding greater compensation in these conditions, whereas females’ compensa-
tion awards were roughly the same across all remorse conditions. In addition, males 
awarded greater compensation than females overall in both experiments. This gen-
der difference is consistent with previous research showing that when gender differ-
ences are observed—although they usually are not—males tend to be more generous 
in awarding compensation (Greene & Bornstein, in press). It might refl ect the gen-
eral fact that in situations of wrongdoing males are more likely than females to re-
quire the transgressor to do something to restore the injured party’s status (Gonzales 
et al., 1994). In the civil trial context, the explicit mechanism for such restoration is 
the awarding of damages. Interestingly, even though males awarded greater compen-
sation to the plaintiff, they tended to perceive the plaintiff in a less sympathetic fash-
ion—and the defendant in a more sympathetic fashion—than did females. 
With regard to injury severity, there was an interaction between severity and re-
morse, such that the effect of remorse occurred for a relatively severe but not for a 
relatively mild injury. This interaction might have occurred because of a fl oor effect 
in the mild injury condition, where the mean award was only $55,158 (as compared 
with the severe injury condition, M =
 
$460,008); that is, in the mild injury condition, 
the effect of remorse had less room to operate. It would be interesting to see whether 
remorse had differential effects for mild and severe injuries where mock jurors were 
also asked to determine the defendant’s liability, and not just to award damages. 
Limitations and Future Directions
The generality of the present research is limited by several factors. First, the mock ju-
rors were undergraduate students—and hence younger and more educated than the 
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general population of those eligible to serve as jurors. Although mock jurors’ verdicts 
do not differ substantially depending on whether they are students or a more diverse, 
community-drawn sample (Bornstein, 1999), some research has found that civil ju-
rors’ demographic or attitudinal characteristics have a statistically signifi cant—albeit 
small—effect on their verdicts (Greene & Bornstein, in press). Thus, it would be de-
sirable to replicate the present fi ndings with a more diverse sample of mock jurors. 
In addition, participants in the present experiments did not deliberate to a consen-
sus verdict, as would jurors in an actual malpractice case. Group damage awards tend 
to be lower than the awards made by individuals (Davis, Au, Hulbert, Chen, & Zar-
noth, 1997). This fi nding does not necessarily imply that group verdicts would be af-
fected any less (or more) than individual verdicts by the defendant’s display of re-
morse; but the present results should be replicated with deliberating juries before 
making strong recommendations to malpractice defendants about how they should 
behave. 
Third, mock jurors only awarded damages, without fi rst determining the defen-
dant’s liability (i.e., responsibility). Thus, it is unknown whether their attributions 
or assumptions about responsibility could have mediated the amount of compensa-
tion awarded. Responsibility, or fault, is an important element of how an apology is 
received (Scher & Darley, 1997), and future research that includes a liability phase 
should explore the inferences about responsibility that jurors might draw from a de-
fendant’s remorse. Nonetheless, it is valuable to study the processes by which ju-
rors make damage awards in isolation. The damages phase is a particularly unstruc-
tured component of civil trials (Greene & Bornstein, 2000), and the same variables 
often affect liability judgments and damage awards differently (Greene & Born-
stein, in press). 
Fourth, the present study operationalized the defendant’s apology in terms of his 
degree of remorse. Other apology strategies exist, such as admitting fault, promis-
ing to avoid future transgressions, and offering to correct the transgression (Scher 
& Darley, 1997). Future research should address the effectiveness of these strategies 
for malpractice defendants relative to a display of remorse. It seems likely that some 
strategies (e.g., admitting fault) would exert a greater effect on judgments of the de-
fendant’s liability, while other strategies (e.g., remorse) would exert a greater effect 
on the awarding of damages. 
Recommendations and Conclusions
Despite these limitations, we can offer some tentative recommendations. Should phy-
sicians apologize for their mistakes? Our fi ndings indicate that a show of remorse at 
the damages phase of trial does not affect physician defendants adversely. Other re-
search suggests that apologizing earlier can even reduce the chance that a malpractice 
lawsuit will be fi led (Fiesta, 1994; Lowes, 1997), and that it might also restore both 
the patient’s and the physician’s sense of justice (Bazemore, 1998; Cohen, 1999). In 
a non-litigious society, those benefi ts would be enough to recommend apology as the 
appropriate response to wrongdoing in medical contexts. However, our results also 
show that apologizing at the time the adverse event occurs leads to higher damage 
awards than not apologizing, especially when the injury is relatively severe. In a civ-
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il justice system where such conduct could be used to urge jurors to infer more culpa-
ble behavior—as it may be in most American jurisdictions, with a few notable excep-
tions (e.g., Massachusetts, Texas, California, Vermont)— defendant physicians must 
unfortunately be very guarded about when and how they display remorse for a pa-
tient’s negative outcome. 
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